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The compromise enhancing effect of lobbying on public policy has been established in two 
typical settings. In the first, lobbies are assumed to act as 'principals' and the setters of the 
policy (the candidates in a Downsian electoral competition or the elected policy maker in a 
citizen- candidate model of electoral competition) are conceived as 'agents'. In the second 
setting, the proposed policies are solely determined by the lobbies who are assumed to take 
the dual role of 'principals' in one stage of the public-policy game and 'agents' in its second 
stage. The objective of this paper is to demonstrate that in the latter setting, the compromising 
effect of lobbying need not exist. Our reduced-form, two-stage public-policy contest, where 
two interest groups compete on the approval or rejection of the policy set by a politician, is 
sufficient to show that the proposed and possibly implemented policy can be more extreme 
and less efficient than the preferred policies of the interest groups. In such situations then 
more than the calf (interest groups) wish to suck the cow (politician) desires to suckle thereby 
threatening the public well being more than the lobbying interest groups. The main result 
specifies the conditions that give rise to such a situation under both the perfectly and 
imperfectly discriminating contests. 
JEL Code: D72, D6. 
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Lobbying is an important part of the policy-making process in representative 
democracies, Grossman and Helpman (2001), Persson and Tabellini (2000). Several 
studies have addressed the issue to what extent lobbying affect policy? Modeling 
lobbying as a "menu-auction", Grossman and Helpman (1996) study a Downsian 
model of electoral competition where candidates choose policies to maximize their 
probability of winning the elections. In their common agency setting, lobbying 
induces candidates to select policies that constitute a compromise between the policy 
preferences of voters and the lobbies. More recently, building on the work of Besley 
and Coate (1997, 2001), Felli and Merlo (2001) study an alternative citizen-candidate 
model of electoral competition with "menu-auction" lobbying, assuming that the 
elected policy maker selects the lobbies that take part in the policy-making process. In 
their elaborate model, the equilibrium policy outcome is always a compromise 
between the policy preferences of the elected candidate and those of the (at most two) 
lobbies chosen by the policy maker. 
1  In contrast to this literature, Glazer, Gradstein 
and Konrad (1998) demonstrate that extreme policies may appear not in spite of, but 
because of, political opposition.  More specifically, an incumbent may gain political 
support by adopting a policy the challenger is more likely to change. The awareness 
of voters to the high cost of the more likely policy change induces them to support the 
extreme policy proposed by the incumbent. The examples that are given by the 
authors are anti-abortion stands by the republican party in the United States, pro-
affirmative action positions by the Democrats in the United States, adoption of the 
poll tax by Thatcher's government in the United Kingdom and moves towards 
privatization in some of the former Communist countries of Eastern Europe.  
          In a "menu-auction", an equilibrium comprises a set of contribution schedules 
that are optimal for the interest groups in light of the anticipated behavior of the 
politician who selects a policy that is his best response to the implicit offers of the 
                                  
1 In the classical Downsian model of electoral competition, politicians are only concerned about 
winning the election. In a two-party system with politicians who are "office motivated", an extreme 
compromise, namely, complete policy convergence is expected, Downs (1957). In a more general 
setting, politicians may face a trade-off between two objectives: the desire to be re-elected and the 
desire to implement a policy that is most preferred by the constituency supporting their party. In such 
an extended dynamic electoral model in which the voters are not fully informed about the preferences 
of the incumbent, Alesina and Cukierman (1990) show that the incumbent follows a policy which is a 
compromise between the other party's ideal policy and his own ideal policy. In these earlier studies, 
however, the effect of lobbying on the nature of the proposed policy has not been examined. 
  1interest groups. But an alternative political-economic equilibrium may comprise of 
the policy proposals that are optimal for the interest groups in light of the anticipated 
outcome of the lobbying contest that hinges on their lobbying efforts. In this 
alternative setting the lobbing efforts are directed to the politician who approves one 
of the proposed policies and the contest outcome is the winning probabilities of the 
proposed policies.
2 Epstein and Nitzan (2004a) have recently shown that in such a 
reduced-form, two-stage lobbying game, the policies proposed by the contestants also 
tend to be restrained. Consequently, as in the common agency literature, the 
implemented (winning) policy is always a compromise, that is, it belongs to the 
interior of the interval defined by the interest groups' (ex-post) preferred policies. 
However, in an imperfectly discriminating contest, the proposals of the different 
groups will not coincide.  Munster (2004) shows that in a perfectly discriminating 
contest, (an all-pay auction) the proposed policies also tend to be restrained.  In 
contrast to Epstein and Nitzan (2004a), the proposals in the all-pay auction will 
coincide.   
          An  alternative  reduced-form  public-policy  contest  is  studied  in  Epstein  and 
Nitzan (2003, 2002a). In this extended contest there are three players. Two interest 
groups and a two-tier government. One interest group is "a challenger" who is 
interested in the approval of the proposed policy. A second interest group is "a 
defender" who prefers the status quo and is therefore interested in the rejection of the 
proposed policy. The government consists of an elected politician who sets the agenda 
(proposes a policy that along with the status quo constitutes the agenda) and approves 
or rejects the proposed policy. The behavior of the politician can have 
microfoundations as shown in Epstein and Nitzan (2002b, 2004b). It is represented, as 
is common in the vast rent-seeking literature, Lockard and Tullock (2001), Nitzan 
(1994), by a contest success function (CSF) that relates the probability that the 
proposed policy is approved to the lobbying efforts of the interest groups. The timing 
of events in this public-policy contest is as follows: (i) In the first stage of the game, 
the politician proposes a policy, being aware of the preferences of the interest groups 
and anticipating the equilibrium in the lobbying contest. (ii) Given the CSF, the 
                                  
2 The interest groups can also try and influence the proposed policy. In our setting the proposed policy 
is not directly affected by the lobbying groups. However, it is indirectly affected by the interest groups 
in light of the awareness of the politician, who proposes the policy,  to the lobbying efforts of the 
interest groups and their effect on the outcome of the contest. 
  2lobbying contest takes place (iii) The actual value of the policy is realized and 
uncertainty is resolved. The objective of the current paper is to show that within a 
general class of this public-policy contest, contrary to the findings of Grossman and 
Helpman (1996), Felli and Merlo (2001) and Epstein and Nitzan (2004a), lobbying 
may result in the proposal and implementation of an extreme policy. In other words, 
lobbying is not necessarily compromise enhancing. This result crucially depends on 
the policy maker (the politician in our case) being a 'principal' and on his having an 
effective incentive to be extreme. The existence of such an incentive hinges on the 
payoffs (contest stakes) of the interest groups and their dependence on the 
implemented policy and on the preferences of the policy maker.  In contrast to Epstein 
and Nitzan (2004a) and Munster (2004), who consider the case where two interest 
groups compete over the approval of a policy that each of them proposes, in this paper 
we assume that the  decision on the proposal is made by the politician and not by the 
interest groups. As in Hillman (1982), Grossman and Helpman (2001) and Epstein 
and Nitzan (2003), we assume that the politician's utility is a composite function of 
the public well being (social welfare) and the lobbying outlays made by the interest 
groups. When the lobbying outlays are positively related to the policy set by the 
politician, the stronger his narrow motivation represented by the weight assigned to 
the lobbying outlays, the more extreme is the proposed policy. It is therefore possible 
that the defender and the challenger of the status quo prefer a policy  which is less 
radical and more efficient than the policy proposed by the politician.  In particular, it 
is possible that more than the calf (challenger of the status-quo policy) wishes to suck 
the cow (politician) desires to suckle. When this happens the politician seems to be 
more concerned than the challenger about enhancing the latter’s interest.
3  We analyze 
both the perfectly and imperfectly discriminating contests. Our main result specifies 
sufficient conditions to lobbying that give rise to a proposed policy which is more 
extreme than the proposals preferred by the interest groups
4.  Examples of such 
                                  
3 Esteban and Ray (1999) observe that in a classical contest game where the two players not only have 
to decide about how much lobbing effort to provide, but also for which alternative they want to lobby, 
all lobbyists will always invest their effort in favor of their most preferred policy alternative. Hence we 
would have expected that  agenda setting does not harm the interest groups while enhancing  a 
compromise .  As mentioned above, we show that this is not the case and that the proposed policy may 
well be more extreme even relative to the ideal certain proposal of the challenger.   Note that if the 
proposed equilibrium policy is approved, it is also implemented because, ex-post, the challenger prefers 
it to his ex-ante most preferred policy. 
4 Our main result is related to the studies of Cairns and Long (1991) and Glazer and McMillan (1992) 
on voluntary price regulation. Using a different settings inspired by Becker’s (1983) pressure model, 
  3policies can be the type of policies presented by Glazer, Gradstein and Konrad (1998)  
(see discussion above) or other examples such as the determination of minimum 
wage, see Grossman and Helpman (2001, Chapter 8.2), where the proposed minimum 
wage is more extreme than the union’s most preferred wage.  Another example is the 
issue of migration quotas which is very important in the United States and in Europe.  
Governments determine quotas that may well exceed the quota preferred by the 
capital owner who takes part in the political contest over the quota, and this quota can 
be lower than his optimal amount of migrants in a situation where the quota is 
certainly approved (there is no political contest on the determination of the quota), see 
for example Boeri, Hanson and McCormick (2002).  The price of a regulated 
monopoly, Baik (1999), Epstein and Nitzan (2003), or the degree of restriction of 
bank branching, Kroszner and Strahan (1999), may well be other examples where the 
proposed policy is more extreme than the policy that would have been proposed by 
the relevant interest groups.  
           We first present the public policy game and then the conditions that lead to 
non-compromise enhancing lobbying under imperfectly and the perfectly 
discriminating contests.  
 
II. The Public-Policy Game 
In our game there are three players.  The first one is a politician, who sets the policy 
proposal I in the first stage of the game. His proposal is approved or rejected in the 
end. The decisions of the two-tier government  (the proposed policy and whether it is 
approved or rejected) determine the ex-ante and ex-post payoffs of the two other 
players, the interest groups that are differently affected by the proposed policy and its 
approval or rejection.  Both players derive some benefit if the government supports 
their preferred policy by approving or by rejecting the proposed policy. Suppose that a 
status-quo policy, Is, is challenged by one interest group and defended by another 
group. This policy can be the price of a regulated monopoly, Baik (1999), Epstein and 
Nitzan (2003), the degree of restriction of bank branching, Kroszner and Strahan 
(1999), or the determination of minimum wage, Grossman and Helpman (2001, 
Chapter 8.2). The defender of the status-quo policy (henceforth, interest group d) 
                                                                                               
these authors show that, within a monopoly context, the threat of price regulation due to an effective 
political opposition by consumers may induce the monopolist to price below the unregulated price.  
  4prefers the status-quo policy Is to any alternative policy. The most preferred policy of 
the challenger of the status-quo policy (interest group c) is Ic . With no loss of 
generality, it is assumed that Is < Ic and that the policy Is  (Ic) is the optimal policy 
proposal of the defender (the challenger), provided that his supported policy gains 
certain approval.
5 That is, each of these policies is optimal for the respective interest 
group when it disregards the possibility that its proposed policy can be rejected, in 
which case, by assumption, the policy proposed by the rival interest group is 
approved. 
         The interest groups are engaged in lobbying  activities because they wish  to  
increase their probability of winning the public- policy contest, i.e., secure the 
realization of their preferred policy
6. In our model the lobbying groups do not try to 
directly affect the policy proposed by the politician. Rather, the lobbying efforts are 
directed to the politician who approves or rejects the proposed policy and therefore 
they do affect, indirectly, the policy proposed by the politician. Interest group d wins 
the contest when the proposed policy is rejected. In such a case the status quo Is is 
implemented. Its benefit in such a case is its avoided loss.  Interest group c wins the 
contest when the proposed policy is approved and implemented. The ruling politician 
is responsible for the existence of the contest, being aware of its direct potential 
benefit, namely, of the possibility to benefit from  part or all of the lobbying outlays.  
He may also be aware of the effect of his decision on his probability of being re-
elected either via the expected campaign contributions of the contestants or via the 
expected support of the voters whose welfare depends on the policy of the 
government. 
 
The Rationale  for Creating a Contest Between the Interest Groups. 
The ruling politicians/government could decide to select the policy that results in the 
realization of one of the proposed policies, i.e., to select the policy that generates the 
highest  benefit to one of the interest groups: either the stake nd  for the defender of the 
status group or nc for the challenger .  An alternative option for the government is to 
choose randomly between the two different policies that it faces. Clearly, if the utility 
the government derives from the selection of a policy is positively related to the 
                                  
5 Note that assuming that Is > Ic  would not qualitatively change any of our results.  
6 Modeling the rent seekers as single agents presumes that they have already solved their collective 
action problem.  The proposed model thus applies to already formed interest groups.   
  5aggregate net payoffs (stakes) of the interest groups, then it would never randomize, 
that is, it would select the policy  that generates the higher stake. The probabilities of 
realization of the two policies in the complete-information public-policy contest are 
given by the contest success function (CSF). This function specifies the relationship 
between the interest groups' investment in the so called influence, lobbying or rent-
seeking activities and the probability of realization of the two policies. The expected 
payoff of interest group i is given by  ( ) i u E  and the effort invested by each interest 
group is denoted by xi.   (later on  we examine the relationship between the CSF, 
( ) i u E and xi). 
Suppose that the government’s objective function  ( ) ) ( ); ( ); ( d c d c x x u E u E G +  
depends on the expected payoffs  ( ) i u E and   on the interest groups'  lobbying efforts 
xc+xd=X .  If the government decides not to generate a contest and choose an optimal 
certain  policy,  then the value of the government’s objective function is equal to 
.  It is therefore sensible for the government to create a contest if 
and only if the existence of a contest increases the expected value of its objective 
function. That is,   
()() { c d n G n G Max , }
 (1)  () ) ( ); ( ); ( d c d c x x u E u E G +      >      ( ) ( ) { } c d n G n G Max , 
 
For example, as commonly assumed in the recent political economy literature, 
Grossman and Helpman (2001), Persson and Tabellini (2000), let the government’s 
objective function be a weighted average of the expected social welfare and the 
lobbying efforts: 
 
(2)                            () ( ) () ( )( ) H L H L x x u E u E G + − + + = α α 1 (.)  
The parameters α and (1-α) are the weights assigned to the expected social welfare 
and the contestants’ lobbying outlays.  If the government decides not to generate a 
contest and choose the policy that results in the higher stake nH, then the value of the 
  6government’s objective function is equal to . In this case it  is therefore sensible 
for the government to create a contest if and only if   
H n α
 
(3)                            () ( ) () ( )( ) H H L H L n x x w E w E α α α > + − + + 1  
 
In Epstein and Nitzan (2002d) it is shown that, if the weight assigned to the lobbying 
outlays is greater than the weight assigned to the expected stakes, a contest based on  
CFSs such as the commonly assumed all-pay auction or Tullock’s lottery logit 
functions is preferable to no contest. In such cases then random government behavior 
is  rational. 
   
We now consider two types of contests: the imperfectly and perfectly 
discriminating contests.   
 
The imperfectly discriminating contest            
      Let the ruling politician reject the proposed policy I  with  probability Prd . 
This implies that he approves the preferred policy of interest group d.  With 
probability  Prc  (= 1- Prd  )  he approves the proposed policy I.  The lobbying 
expenditures  xd and xc  of the risk-neutral contestants determine the probability of 
approval of the policy proposed by the regulator.  It is assumed, as in Skaperdas, 
































x x 7 (the latter inequality ensures that the second order conditions 
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.   
The expected net payoff of the two interest groups, d and c are given by 
                                  
7 As already noted, the function Pri( ) is usually referred to as a contest success function (CSF). 
The functional forms of the CSF’s  commonly assumed in the literature, see Nitzan (1994) and 
Skaperdas (1996),  satisfy these assumptions.  
j i x x ,
  7(4)            ( )( ) d d d d x I n u E − = Pr    and    ( ) ( ) c c c c x I n u E − = Pr  
 
where nd and nc denote, respectively, the net benefits or the contest stakes of the 
interest groups. We assume that for any I in the interval [ ] c s I I , , an increase in the 












I n c d . 
8
          By our assumptions, the interest groups participate in the contest, that is, xd and 
xc are positive.  We therefore focus on interior Nash equilibria of the second stage of 
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In the first stage of the game, the politician selects his strategy, that is, the proposed 
policy I subject to, the political constraint, namely, subject to the lobbying contest on 
the approval of his proposal.  Hence, as mentioned above, his objective function G(.) 
is of the general form
9  ( ) ( ); ( ); ( d c d c x x u E u E G ) + , where E(uc) and E(ud) are the 
expected net payoffs of the challenger and the defender that positively affect G.  The 
contestants’ lobbying outlays (xd + xc)=X represent either transfers to the government 
or resources wasted in the contest. Note that taking into account the public interest is 
consistent with the politician being either  benevolent  or realistic (wishing to be re-
elected). 
                                  
8 This condition holds in many situations. In particular, it holds in the context of monopoly-price 
regulation where  Is  is the competitive status-quo price and  Ic is the profit-maximizing monopoly 
price, see Epstein and Nitzan (2003). The assumption is also plausible in the context of minimum-wage 
determination, where Is  represents the existing equilibrium wage and Ic represents the minimum wage 
preferred by the workers’ union or in the context of  protective trade policy (by tariff or quota).  
9 See Epstein and Nitzan (2002a). 
  8          The first order condition for an interior maximization of G(.) with respect to I 
requires that 
  












































A sub-game perfect interior Nash equilibrium of the public-policy contest is thus 
characterized by the three equalities in (5) and (6). 
 
A Non-Compromising Equilibrium Policy 
The existence of a non-compromising equilibrium policy requires that the policy 
maker has an effective incentive to propose a policy that is more extreme than one of 
the preferred proposals of the interest groups. The effectiveness of the incentive in our 
setting is partly due to the fact that the policy preferred by both the challenger and the 
defender is restrained. Let us first clarify this point by considering the proposed 
policies that the interest groups prefer. By assumption, interest group d  prefers the 
status-quo   to any proposed policy. Since  maximizes the stake of this interest 
group,  









. Similarly, the policy Ic  maximizes the stake of interest group 








.  To understand the result let us consider the 




( ) c u E  is characterized by the following first order condition: 










































c c  
By the two main results in Epstein and Nitzan (2004),
10 as long as the two interest 
groups engage in a viable contest in the second stage of the game, in equilibrium they 
are induced to voluntarily moderate their proposals relative to their best policies when 
they do not need to take into account the opposition of the other interest group.  Thus, 
                                  
10 It can be verified that the conditions needed for applying the results in Epstein and Nitzan (2004) are 
satisfied. 
  9 
Lemma 1:  Under the imperfectly discriminating contest     
                                         and X 
* * * * , d c s d c c I I where I I I I > > <
*> 0   
 
In light of this lemma, the challenger would not lobby for his best policy under 
certainty Ic , but rather for his optimal policy  , and the defender would not lobby for 
his best policy under certainty I
*
c I
s , but rather for his optimal policy  . The optimal 
policies   and   maximize the expected net payoffs of c and d.   The intuition for 







c. In the 
presence of an opposition, the challenger realizes that lowering his proposal below Ic 
leads to a decrease of his payoff from winning the contest. But the more restrained 
proposal yields an increase in the payoff of the opponent and, in turn, a reduction in 
his stake that induces him to become less aggressive. The resulting decline in the 
defender’s probability of winning the contest clearly benefits the challenger. Since the 
latter favorable effect dominates the former unfavorable effect, the challenger prefers 
to restrain his lobbying target, i.e., propose a policy below Ic. A similar intuition 
explains the readiness of the defender of the status-quo to moderate his position by 
proposing a policy that exceeds Is .   
  As the proposals of the contestants do not converge, both will invest effort in 
order to win the contest and therefore the total amount of resources invested in such a 
contest will be positive, X
*
 > 0. 
           
A perfectly discriminating contest 
          Let us now consider the endogenous policy proposals of the defender and the 
challenger under the perfectly discriminating contest, i.e., the all-pay auction. Under 
this type of contest, the interest group that invests the highest amount of effort wins 
the contest. That is, the winning probability of interest group i  is equal to: 
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and so its net payoff is given by: 














≠ ∀ > −
≠ ∀ = −
≠ ∀ > −
=
j i x x if x
j i x x if x I n
j i x x if x I n
u E
i j i
j i i i










Munster (2004) shows that under the all-pay auction, in equilibrium both players 
propose the same proposal. That is, 
 
Lemma 2:  Under the perfectly discriminating contest 
* * * * , d c s d c c I I that such I I I I = > < and  X
*
 = 0. 
 
 
Since the two interest groups propose the same policy, there will be no need for a 
contest between the groups. This implies that the interest groups will not invest effort 
in trying to win the contest, X
*=0.   
  The difference in the findings in the two types of contests is due to their 
different nature. In an imperfectly discriminating contest, the group that chooses the 
higher lobbying outlay doesn't necessarily win.  There is some "noise" in the 
determination of the winner and the winning probabilities are continuous functions of 




  11Public Policy 
The effectiveness of the policy maker's incentive to propose a policy that exceeds Ic
* 
or   is lower than Id* depends on the sensitivity of G  with respect to its three 
arguments and on the sensitivity of the equilibrium total lobbying outlays X*    and of 
the expected utility of the interest groups with respect to the proposed policy. Let I** 
denote the equilibrium policy that satisfies (6).  At  Ic
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.  By the 
equilibrium condition (6) ,  we therefore get that  I
**>Ic 
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 and  the sensitivity of G(.) 
with respect to  X  relative to its sensitivity with respect to  ( ) d u E and   is 
sufficiently large. 
() c u E
 
  
Note that  () ( ) 0   0









u E and I
u E . Therefore, since   
() () 0 0
** **
> ∂ > ∂
= = I I c I I d u E
G and u E
G ,  if  0
** > ∂
∂
= I I I
X , then for (10) to 
hold,   0
** > ∂
∂
= I I X
G  must be satisfied. 
If, for example,  () ( ) ) ( ) ( ); ( ); ( d c d c d c x x G x x u E u E G + = + , then (both in the 
perfectly and imperfectly discriminating contest) a sufficient condition for the 








11  Recall that under the perfectly 
discriminating contest, the all-pay auction, the total amount of resources invested in 
the contest under the proposals of the interest groups will be zero.  Therefore, if the 
politician wishes to obtain outlays, he/she must propose a policy that is more extreme 
than that of the interest groups.  
As we can see, in the above condition the effect of a change in the proposed 
policy on the lobbying efforts of the contestants plays an important role. In general, 
the effect of a change in the proposed policy I on X* is ambiguous in the imperfectly 
discriminating contest while it is positive in the all-pay auction. The role of stake-






 is clarified in Epstein and Nitzan (2004b). 
12 A simple sufficient condition 
ensuring that the total lobbying outlays are monotone increasing in the policy set by 
the politician is stated in terms of the relative stakes and the relative- stake- elasticities 
of the interest groups
13  
The Proposition implies that the policy set by the politician can be higher or 
lower than the policy the challenger prefers, provided that two conditions are 
satisfied. First, the sufficient condition ensuring that an increase in the policy proposal 
I increases the total lobbying efforts of the two interest groups (which is satisfied in 
the case of an all-pay auction); Second, the marginal effect on G of a change in the 
contestants’ total lobbying expenditures is sufficiently high relative to the marginal 
effect on G of a change in the expected utility of the interest groups. In other words, 
an increase in the policy I has two conflicting effects on G.  It increases G via the 
increase in the total lobbying expenditures X while decreasing G via the reduction in 
the expected payoffs of the status-quo defender and its challenger. The condition 
                                  
11 For example, in the case of monopoly price determination, if the demand is given by: p= 1-q, the 
marginal cost equals zero and the CSF is Tullock’s lottery logit function, the monopoly profit-
maximization price is equal to 0.5 while the price that maximizes the total lobbying efforts incurred by  
the contestants is  equal to  0.575426.  
12 Note that asymmetry in the contestants’ ability depends on the form of the contest success function 
and, in particular, on its second order cross derivatives. However,  it also depends  on the stakes of the 
interest groups because these cross derivatives are computed in equilibrium, which is affected by the 
stakes.  
13 In the context of monopoly regulation, Epstein and Nitzan (2003), the sufficient condition is 
satisfied, so an increase in the proposed price increases the total lobbying expenditure of the interest 
groups.  
 
  13stated in the Proposition requires that the former effect on G is sufficiently high 
relative to the latter effect. Since, by lemmas 1 and 2, for example, the challenger's 
certain most preferred policy Ic*  is smaller than Ic ,it is clear that under such 
circumstances, the equilibrium policy I** proposed by the politician can exceed both 
the challenger's preferred policy Ic
* and Ic  (in the same way the policy may be lower 
than Id
* and Is). Note that if the proposed policy I
**, I** > Ic
*, is the ex-post outcome 
of the contest, namely, the politician’s proposal I
**  is approved by the politician, then 
the challenger voluntarily offers its cooperation to implement this policy because ex-
post it is preferred to Ic*. One can relate to the proposed policy I
** and to the 
challenger’s optimal policy Ic
* as direct measures of the extent of the permissible and 
the (challenger’s) desired surplus extraction from the defender. The conditions stated 
in the Proposition give rise to a situation where the proposed policy is more extreme 
and less efficient than the challenger's ex-ante preferred policy. In such a case 
lobbying is not compromise enhancing and one can say that more than the calf (the 





In the political-economic game of policy determination by the government that we 
have analyzed, a politician proposes the public policy and the proposal is then 
approved or rejected according to a CSF.  In contrast to Epstein and Nitzan (2004a), 
we assume that the politician proposes a policy and not the interest groups.  The 
politician’s proposed policy directly affects the stakes of the two interest groups, the 
contestants, and, in turn, first, their equilibrium lobbying efforts and, second, their 
equilibrium expected payoffs. The proposed policy is set such that the politician’s 
objective function that depends on the contestants’ lobbying outlays and on their 
aggregate expected  payoff  is maximized.  It has been shown that, depending on the 
objective function of the politician and on the interest groups' net payoffs, it may well 
be the case that the proposed policy is higher, more extreme and less efficient than the 
policy the interest groups would have preferred that the politician proposed under 
                                  
14 Of course, ex-ante any equilibrium is a compromise because it is a lottery between the status quo and 
the proposed policy. The non-existence of the compromising  effect of lobbying in our setting focuses 
on the comparison between  the policy proposed by the politician and the policy proposal that is 
actually preferred by  the challenger. Of course, ex-post ,a more extreme proposed policy can be 
implemented.   
15 The same type of analysis can be carried out for the defender. 
  14certainty. Such a situation occurs when, first, an increase in the policy proposal   
increases the total lobbying efforts of the two interest groups and, second, the 
marginal effect on  the politician’s objective function of a change  in the contestants’  
lobbying outlays is sufficiently high relative to the marginal effect of a change in the 
expected utility of the interest groups. The proposed policy can, in particular, be the 
policy that maximizes the challenger’s certain stakes. If this is the case, that is, if the 
politician proposes the challenger’s optimal policy under certainty, then we are 
assured that the challenger always prefers a less extreme policy. However, the 
proposed policy may be even more extreme than the policy that maximizes the 
challenger’s certain stakes.          
In our model the lobbying efforts of the interest groups are directed to the 
politicians at the second stage of approval or rejection of the proposed policy.   
Alternatively, the interest groups can lobby the politician at the first stage in order to 
influence his proposed policy. In general, the interest groups may wish to influence 
both the proposed policy and the probability of its approval and therefore allocate 
their lobbying efforts between the two stages. In such alternative lobbying models, as 
long as the proposed policy or the approval of the proposed policy remain uncertain 
from the viewpoint of the interest groups, the main insight of the present study is 
basically preserved. Uncertainty regarding the contest outcome and a policy maker 
who is a 'principal' are the basic modeling features necessary for the existence of non-
compromising lobbying. The sufficient conditions require appropriate relative 
commitments of the politician to the enhancement of the well being of the interest 
groups and to the increase of the lobbying outlays and appropriate relative stakes and 
relative stake elasticities of the interest groups that ensure the positive effect of a 
change in the proposed policy on the total lobbying efforts.  Therefore, we obtain that 
if the government is not directly involved in the determination of the proposals (as in 
Epstein and Nitzan, 2004a), then moderation of the proposals will occur, however, if 
the goovernment is involved directliy in determining the proposal, then we have 
shown sufficient conditions for polarization.  
Our analysis has been confined to a reduced-form, very simple public-policy 
contest that has micro foundations for both the imperfectly discriminating contest and 
the discriminating contest - the all-pay auction. Despite its simplicity, this stylized 
setting is sufficient to illustrate that the compromise enhancing effect of lobbying is 
not necessarily valid when the policy maker, the politician in our case, is a 'principal' 
  15rather than an 'agent'. As is well known from other models of special interest politics, 
institutional details - such as the number of candidates, the number of interest groups, 
the voting rule, the amendment rules, the procedures for government formation and 
dissolution - can have a marked effect on outcomes. This has been indeed 
demonstrated in this paper regarding the effect of lobbying on the nature of the 
equilibrium public policy.  
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